Minimizing credit risks under relaxed loan features : (Record no. 3667)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 05624 a2200217 4500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250805023424.0 |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Kraft, Norman William S. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 13937 |
| 245 1# - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Minimizing credit risks under relaxed loan features : |
| Remainder of title | the production loan easy access program experience / |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. | Norman S. William Kraft. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 37 leaves, 34 unnumbered leaves |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| -- | Kraft, N. W. S. (2018). Minimizing credit risks under relaxed loan features: The production loan easy access program experience (Unpublished master's thesis). Public Management Development Program, Development Academy of the Philippines. |
| 502 ## - DISSERTATION NOTE | |
| Department | Public Management and Development Program |
| Program | Senior Executive Class |
| Batch | Batch 6 |
| Additional Note | hesis (SEC)--Development Academy of the Philippines. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017-2022 mentions limited access to credit as one of the long-standing challenges in Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (AFF) that continue to hamper productivity (National Economic and Development Authority, 2017). the present administration is therefore providing affordable and easy-to-access credit to small farmers and fisherfolk through the implementation of the Production Loan Easy Access Program (PLEA), a special government credit program for marginal and small farmers and fisherfolk being implemented by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC). The PLEA program offers very relaxed features that include a no-collateral uniform low interest rate of 6% per annum, loan maturity period of at least two years, and a maximum 30-day loan processing. The program also offers a maximum loan amount of up to Php50, 000 per borrower. Only small farmers and fisherfolk registered in the Registry System for Basic Sectors in Agriculture (RSBSA) are eligible to borrow under the program. The program absorbs full credit risk arising from loan losses and the lending conduit bears no credit risk. While not necessarily bad in itself, "affordable, fast, and convenient" features make the PLEA program loans highly vulnerable to "opportunistic behavior" of borrowers. In fact, the easy features of the PLEA program are reminiscent of the credit supply-led policies adopted by the government in the 1970s and 1980s. The PLEA program, therefore, might lead to the same unwanted experience of past subsidized agricultural credit programs and potentially draw the participation of bad credit risk that result in high default rates. To avoid going around the same policy cycle and repeating the same mistake in the implementation of agricultural credit programs, policy options have to be identified in order to determine, once and for all, which policy is the best in mitigating the problem of credit risks: * Under a market-based solution, the proposal is for ACPC's accredited partner lending institutions and the farmer-barriers to simply transact among themselves and freely arrive at their own respective individual agreements, not just on loan pricing but also on loan maturity, loan security, and other terms and requirements. * Under the government intervention solution, the Department of Agriculture (DA)/ ACPC will set and impose standards on borrowers' farming inputs or processes and also on their levels (or equity) of output. Either penalties or rewards shall be imposed on deviations to the set standards. * Under a policy status quo, the DA/ACPC's lending program will continue to be implemented as is with unmitigated high-powered incentives. To determine which of the mentioned policy options can provide the most optimal response to the concern on credit risks, each of the first two policy options was analyzed using relevant theoretical frameworks. For the status quo option, analysis was done by evaluating program monitoring data that were gathered and processed by the ACPC as well as other available relevant secondary data. A descriptive cost-benefit analysis for each of the different policy options was also done. Applying the commonly used criteria for evaluation (i.e., effectiveness, efficiency, social equity, legal feasibility, administrative feasibility, and political acceptability), Policy Option 1 (market solution) passed 3 out of the 6 criteria; Policy Option 2 (government intervention) passed 5 out of 6; while Policy Option 3 (status quo) also passed 3 out of the 6 criteria. The paper therefore recommends the adoption of the government intervention policy (option 2) of imposing standards on borrowers' farming inputs or processes and also on their levels (or quality) of output in order to bring down the PLEA program's level of credit risks. The recommended policy option can best address the issue of credit risk among the three options evaluated. While the market solution also solves the problem of credit risks, it comes at the cost of social equity and efficiency because of the presence of market failures. With the policy status quo, there is potentially high credit risks entailed. The proposed policy of government intervention is the effective solution to address the concern over the PLEA program's potentially high credit risks without sacrificing its good social equity and political acceptability standing. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical term or geographic name entry element | Production Loan Easy Access. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 22584 |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical term or geographic name entry element | Loans. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 22585 |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical term or geographic name entry element | Agricultural credits. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 22586 |
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Badiola, Jocelyn Alma R. (Member) |
| 9 (RLIN) | 13941 |
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Gutierrez, Jonathan (Member) |
| 9 (RLIN) | 13942 |
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Gonzalez, Eduardo T. (Member) |
| 9 (RLIN) | 6565 |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Access method | Yes |
| Materials specified | No |
| Electronic format type | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | https://library.dap.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-retrieve-file.pl?id=2e03ba8a394959dc0e1124f948c938d4 |
| Link text | View Digital Copy |
| Group | STAFF |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | THESIS |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme | Library of Congress Classification |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Date acquired | Total Checkouts | Full call number | Barcode | Date last seen | Price effective from | Koha item type | Date last checked out |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Library of Congress Classification | MAIN | MAIN | 05/15/2019 | HD 1491 K734 2018 c.1 | TD01252 | 05/15/2019 | 05/15/2019 | THESIS | ||||||
| Library of Congress Classification | MAIN | MAIN | 05/15/2019 | 2 | HD 1491 K734 2018 c.2 | TD01253 | 11/13/2019 | 05/15/2019 | THESIS | 11/09/2019 |