McLaren, J. (Ed.). (2003). Institutional elements of tax design and reform. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Overview -- Corruption in Tanzania: counting and franchise bidding -- Value added tax evasion, auditing and transaction matching -- Fiscal pathologies and federal politics: understanding tax arrears in Russia's regions -- The political economy of center-state fisal transfer in India -- Corruption and the organization of tax administration: non-smithian benefits from specialization -- Incentive effects of performance-based rewards in tax administration -- Leadership or institutions? reputation, retaliation and opportunistic taxation

This is a study of the constraints on fiscal systems imposed by problems of institutions, administration and incentives in Third-World and post-socialist economies. The contributors examine institutions and their impact from different perspectives. The essays tackle four basic topics: the administration of indirect taxation; politics and incentives in fiscal federalism; organizational design and tax compliance; and reputation and opportunism in taxation. Chapters consider the problems of tax evasion and corruption and consider ways to combat them, including privatization of tax collection efforts; the use of value-added tax (VAT) programmes; and increases in functional specialization with the tex bureaucracy. The contributors also analyze methods of identifying and quantifying tax evasion and discuss ways to provide appropriate incentives for compliance for tax administrators as well as tax payers. Finally, chapters consider the negative incentives to investment created when the government engages in opportunistic taxation. Intended to promote discussion between economists and non-economists working on these problems as well as between academics and practitioners, this book should be of interest to anyone involved in tax policy or tax administration. - From the Book