Strengthening NAPOLCOM's disciplinary mechanisms as the central oversight agency of the PNP Mylene M. Eguilos-Caluya.
Description: 35 leaves, 142 unnumbered leaves : illustrationsSubject(s): Online resources: Dissertation note: Public Management and Development Program Senior Executive Class Batch 7 Thesis (SEC)--Development Academy of the Philippines. Summary: For the past three decades, the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) serves as the central oversight agency of the Philippine National Police (PNP). As such, it is mandated under the 1987 Philippine Constitution to administer and control the PNP. This mandate is further qualified to mean "administrative control" and "operational supervision" under its enabling laws, Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act No. 8551. A very broad and ambiguous mandate that unfortunately undermines the core values, discipline and integrity, of an independent oversight agency. Apparently, NAPOLCOM focused more on the administrative and operational matters and not on the disciplinary matters affecting the PNP. It has divided strategic direction, which leans more on its legal mandate rather than on the purpose of its creation. As a result, NAPOLCOM has no consistent and focused strategic direction on what and where it wants to be . If at all, its actions, programs and projects are not aligned to NAPOLCOM's vision "to be a competent and responsive overseer of an effective police service" Consequently, different productivity problems arose that are not directly addressed by NAPOLCOM such as long queues, delays, complaints, case backlogs, overworked employees, among others. These pose as challenges to NAPOLCOM's effectivity as the overseer of PNP. There are also several government and market failures identified which serve as indicators that there is a serious policy issue that affects NAPOLCOM effectivity as the central oversight agency of the PNP In order to addres this issue, the author first identified stakeholders involved and evaluative criteria that may be used in analyzing the present situation. With this, the following three policy alternatives are being proposed: 1. Internal Efficiency Option; 2. Bilateral MOA's Option; And 3. Recalibration of NAPOLCOM's Disciplinary Mechanisms Option These three options are analyzed and evaluated using the Stakeholders Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis. Based on the results of the analysis conducted, the author recommends to adopt the third option coupled with the first option. This will directly address the internal challenges that NAPOLCOM repeatedly encountered during the past years, and in effect, prepares it for the recalibration of its strategic direction giving utmost priority to police discipline and integrity. While there may still be possible challenges, NAPOLCOM can already faced them with a clear, focused and wholistic direction toward its vision.Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Barcode | |
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THESIS | MAIN | KPM 1551 E385 2019 c.2 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | TD01227 | |
THESIS | MAIN | KPM 1551 E385 2019 c.1 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | TD01226 |
Eguilos-Caluya, M. M. (2019). Strengthening NAPOLCOM's disciplinary mechanisms as the central oversight agency of the PNP (Unpublished master's thesis). Public Management Development Program, Development Academy of the Philippines.
Public Management and Development Program Senior Executive Class Batch 7 Thesis (SEC)--Development Academy of the Philippines.
For the past three decades, the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) serves as the central oversight agency of the Philippine National Police (PNP). As such, it is mandated under the 1987 Philippine Constitution to administer and control the PNP. This mandate is further qualified to mean "administrative control" and "operational supervision" under its enabling laws, Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act No. 8551. A very broad and ambiguous mandate that unfortunately undermines the core values, discipline and integrity, of an independent oversight agency. Apparently, NAPOLCOM focused more on the administrative and operational matters and not on the disciplinary matters affecting the PNP. It has divided strategic direction, which leans more on its legal mandate rather than on the purpose of its creation. As a result, NAPOLCOM has no consistent and focused strategic direction on what and where it wants to be . If at all, its actions, programs and projects are not aligned to NAPOLCOM's vision "to be a competent and responsive overseer of an effective police service" Consequently, different productivity problems arose that are not directly addressed by NAPOLCOM such as long queues, delays, complaints, case backlogs, overworked employees, among others. These pose as challenges to NAPOLCOM's effectivity as the overseer of PNP. There are also several government and market failures identified which serve as indicators that there is a serious policy issue that affects NAPOLCOM effectivity as the central oversight agency of the PNP In order to addres this issue, the author first identified stakeholders involved and evaluative criteria that may be used in analyzing the present situation. With this, the following three policy alternatives are being proposed: 1. Internal Efficiency Option; 2. Bilateral MOA's Option; And 3. Recalibration of NAPOLCOM's Disciplinary Mechanisms Option These three options are analyzed and evaluated using the Stakeholders Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis. Based on the results of the analysis conducted, the author recommends to adopt the third option coupled with the first option. This will directly address the internal challenges that NAPOLCOM repeatedly encountered during the past years, and in effect, prepares it for the recalibration of its strategic direction giving utmost priority to police discipline and integrity. While there may still be possible challenges, NAPOLCOM can already faced them with a clear, focused and wholistic direction toward its vision.
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